We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. 
Introduction
One possibility to study the process of coalition formation is to model it as a hedonic coalition formation game. In such a model each player's preferences over coalitions depend only on the composition of members of her coalition. The formation of societies, social clubs and groups are examples in which the hedonic aspect of coalition formation (cf. [11]) plays an important role. Given a hedonic game, the main interest is then in the existence of outcomes (partitions of the set of players) that are stable in some sense. For example, Thanks are due to Anne van den Nouweland for helpful comments. D. Dimitrov gratefully aknowledges …nancial support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
y Corresponding author. Email address: d.dimitrov@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de 1 the focus in [1] , [3] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , and [10] is on the existence of core stable partitions, while [4] and [5] contain su¢ cient conditions for the existence of Nash and individually stable partitions as well.
Most of the stability concepts studied in the literature presuppose that the players in the game are myopic in the sense that they do not take into account how their decisions to form a coalition will a¤ect in the future the decisions of other players. Furthermore, these stability concepts are based either on coalitional deviations (core and strict core stability)
or on individual deviations (Nash, individual, and contractual individual stability).
In this paper we suggest a uni…ed look at the nature of the possible deviations from a given coalition structure, and o¤er a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games. In doing so, we require, no matter how the additional properties of the deviation look like, that there should always exist at least one player who has a strong incentive to move. In this way we describe, including the …ve stability notions mentioned above, ten di¤erent stability concepts for hedonic games. However, not all of these ten notions deserve a special attention because, as it can be shown, there are always coalition structures that are stable in the sense of four of these stability concepts and, moreover, without any preference restrictions. This is the reason why we focus mainly on the existence of two of the new stability concepts -contractual Nash stability and weak individual stability.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce in Section 2 some preliminaries on hedonic games and di¤erent stability concepts that can be found in the literature. A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts is then presented in Section 3, where di¤erent implications between the stability notions are discussed as well. Sections 4, 5, and 6 are devoted to contractual strict core stability, contractual Nash stability and weak individual stability, respectively. We show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist. Moreover, on the class of separable games, a weak mutuality condition su¢ ces for the existence of contractual Nash stable partitions, while a solidarity property guarantees the existence of weak individually stable coalition structures. We conclude in Section 7 with some …nal remarks.
Preliminaries
Consider a …nite set of players N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. A coalition is a non-empty subset of N .
For each player i 2 N , we denote by A i = fX N j i 2 Xg the collection of all coalitions 2 containing i. A collection of coalitions is called a coalition structure if is a partition of N , i.e., the coalitions in are pairwise disjoint and S X2 X = N . For each coalition structure and each player i 2 N , by (i) we denote the coalition in containing i, i.e., (i) 2 and i 2 (i).
We assume that each player i 2 N is endowed with a preference i over A i , i.e., a binary relation over A i which is re ‡exive, complete, and transitive. We denote by = ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n ) a pro…le of preferences i for all i 2 N . Moreover, we assume that the preference of each player i 2 N over coalition structures is purely hedonic, i.e., it is completely characterized by i in such a way that, for each coalition structure and 0 , each player i weakly prefers to 0 if and only if (i) i 0 (i). A hedonic game hN; i is a pair of a …nite set N of players and a preference pro…le .
Now we de…ne stability concepts based on coalitional deviations and on individual deviations, which can be found in the literature. Let hN; i be a hedonic game and let be a coalition structure. We say that is core stable if there does not exist a coalition X such that
is strictly core stable if there does not exist a coalition X such that -X i (i) for all i 2 X, and
is Nash stable if there does not exist a pair (i; X) of i 2 N and
is individually stable if there does not exist a pair (i; X) of i 2 N and X 2 [ f;g such that
is contractual individually stable if there does not exist a pair (i; X) of i 2 N and
Observe that strict core stability implies core stability, Nash stability implies individual stability, and individual stability implies contractual individual stability. Moreover, strict core stability implies individual stability as well.
Taxonomy and interpretations
In this section, we …rst de…ne several sets of coalitions capturing the nature of deviating coalitions for those stability concepts introduced in the previous section. Then, in terms of these sets, some new stability concepts are introduced.
Let hN; i be a hedonic game, and let be a coalition structure. By all( ) we denote the set of all possible deviations from , i.e.,
We next de…ne the sets weak( ), strong( ), nash( ), and cont( ) as follows:
Then, we have the following observation.
Observation 1
The stability concepts introduced in the previous section can be described in terms of weak( ), strong( ), nash( ), and cont( ) as follows:
is core stable , strong( ) = ;;
is strictly core stable , weak( ) = ;;
is Nash stable , nash( ) = ;;
Our …rst example is meant to illustrate the usefulness of de…ning stability concepts in terms of the above sets of deviations.
Example 1 Consider a hedonic game hN; i with N = f1; 2; 3g and = ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) de…ned as follows: f1; 2g 1 f1g 1 f1; 2; 3g 1 f1; 3g; f1; 2; 3g 2 f1; 2g 2 f2; 3g 2 f2g; f1; 2; 3g 3 f1; 3g 3 f2; 3g 3 f3g:
From jN j = 3, there are …ve possible coalition structures, and according to the preference pro…le , the sets weak( ), strong( ), nash( ), and cont( ) for each coalition structure are as follows.
weak( ) strong( ) ff1g; f2g; f3gg ff1; 2g; f2; 3gg ff1; 2g; f2; 3gg ff1; 2g; f3gg ff2; 3gg ; ff1; 3g; f2gg ff1g; f1; 2g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3gg ff1g; f1; 2g; f1; 2; 3gg ff1g; f2; 3gg ff1; 2gg ; ff1; 2; 3gg ff1gg ff1gg nash( ) cont( ) ff1g; f2g; f3gg ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3gg ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3gg ff1; 2g; f3gg ff1; 2; 3gg ff1; 2; 3gg ff1; 3g; f2gg ff1g; f1; 2g; f1; 2; 3gg ff3g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3gg ff1g; f2; 3gg ; ff1; 2; 3gg ff1; 2; 3gg ff1gg ff2; 3gg
For this hedonic game, we have two core stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg and ff1g; f2; 3gg, no strictly core stable coalition structure, one Nash stable coalition structure ff1g; f2; 3gg, two individually stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg and ff1g; f2; 3gg, three contractual individually stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg, ff1g; f2; 3gg, and ff1; 2; 3gg. From the other combinations of weak( ), strong( ), nash( ), and cont( ), we obtain several other stability concepts, namely is weak individually stable , nash( ) \ strong( ) = ;;
is contractual strictly core stable , cont( ) \ weak( ) = ;;
is contractually Nash stable
The correspondences between the stability concepts and the sets of coalitions all( ), weak( ), strong( ), nash( ), and cont( ) are shown in Table 1 .
For example, is weak individually stable if nash( ) \ strong( ) = ;, which means that there does not exist a pair (i; X) of i 2 N and X 2 [ f;g such that every player
Clearly, weak individual stability is implied by core stability, because nash( ) \ strong( ) = ; when strong( ) = ;. On the other hand, weak individual stability is also implied by individual stability, because strong( ) weak( ) and
Example 2 Consider the hedonic game hN; i de…ned in Example 1. For this game, we have two weak individually stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg and ff1g; f2; 3gg;
three contractual strictly core stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg, ff1g; f2; 3gg, and ff1; 2; 3gg;
three contractually core stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg, ff1g; f2; 3gg, and ff1; 2; 3gg;
two contractually Nash stable coalition structures ff1g; f2; 3gg, and ff1; 2; 3gg;
three weak contractual individually stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg, ff1g; f2; 3gg, and ff1; 2; 3gg.
Observe that, for every coalition structure , we have the following inclusions:
Hence, in each row of Table 1 , the stability notion in the …rst column implies the others, and the stability notion in the second column implies the one in the third column.
Moreover, the following inclusions also hold:
Hence, in each column of Table 1 , the stability notion in the …rst row implies the others, the stability notion in the second row implies the one in the fourth row, and the stability notion in the third row implies the one in the fourth row as well. Now let us explain why there are two empty cells in Table 1 . The …rst empty cell corresponds to all( ) \ all( ) = all( ) = ;. Observe that we have all( ) = ; if and only if jN j = 1, which is the trivial case with the unique coalition partition = fN g. The second empty cell corresponds to a coalition structure such that cont( ) \ all( ) = cont( ) = ;. Notice that in this case it is not even indicated why a coalition X 2 cont( ) deviates from a coalition structure , and hence, the notion of a deviation does not make sense. Indeed, cont( ) = ; only if = fN g; otherwise, N 2 cont( ).
Contractual strict core stability
We start our study of the new stability notions presented in the previous section by showing that a contractual strictly core stable coalition structure always exists. As a related 7 result, it was shown in [2] that, on any preference domain, a contractual individually stable coalition structure always exists, where a coalition structure is contractual individually stable if and only if nash( ) \ cont( ) \ weak( ) = ;. Here, we slightly extend this result. Namely, we show that, on any preference domain, a contractual strictly core stable coalition structure always exists. Recall that a coalition structure is contractual strictly core stable if cont( ) \ weak( ) = ;;
i.e., there does not exist a coalition X such that X i (i) for all i 2 X, X j (j) for some j 2 X, and (i) n X i (i) for all i 2 N n X.
According to the arguments in the previous section, for every coalition structure ,
we have the following inclusions:
Hence, contractual strict core stability implies contractual core stability, contractual individual stability, and weak contractual individual stability. Our result implies that, on any preference domain, there always exists a coalition structure which is contractual strictly core stable, contractually core stable, contractual individually stable, and weak contractual individually stable.
Proposition 1 A contractual strictly core stable coalition structure always exists.
Proof. A contractual strictly core stable coalition structure can be constructed by the following algorithm:
Step 1. Set := fN g.
Step 2. Repeats the following until cont( ) \ weak( ) = ;:
Find an X 2 cont( ) \ weak( ).
Set := fY n X j Y 2 and Y 6 Xg [ fXg.
Step 3. Return .
8
Let be an arbitrary coalition structure such that cont( ) \ weak( ) 6 = ;, and let
Observe that 0 is a coalition structure as well. Thus, by starting with the coalition structure fN g, a coalition structure will be obtained when the algorithm halts. Since the algorithm halts when cont( ) \ weak( ) = ;, the outcome of the algorithm is a contractual strictly core stable coalition structure.
Moreover, for each i 2 N ,
if (i) \ X 6 = ; and i 2 X, we have 0 (i) = X i (i) from X 2 weak( ), and if (i) \ X 6 = ; and i 6 2 X, we have
In other words, no player i is worse o¤ being in 0 (i) than being in (i). From X 2 weak( ), there is at least one i 2 X such that
without being worse o¤, each player i can be better o¤ at most jA i j 1 = 2 n 1 1 times.
It follows then that
Step 2 in the algorithm repeats at most n2 n 1 n times, and therefore, the algorithm halts.
Remark 2 Indeed, in [2] a similar algorithm was proposed for showing the existence of a contractual individually stable coalition structure. Here we essentially show that a similar argument works for a stronger stability concept as well.
Contractual Nash stability
The notion of contractual Nash stability applies to situations in which, in order to move to another coalition, the corresponding player needs only the permission of her current coalition to leave. Imagine for example a criminal society that is already partitioned into groups. In such an environment it seems very plausible that it is easier for someone to join a criminal group than to get a permission to leave an already existing group she is a member of.
More formally, let hN; i be a hedonic game, and let be a coalition structure. As de…ned previously, a partition is contractually Nash stable if nash( ) \ cont( ) = ;;
i.e., there does not exist a pair (i; X) of i 2 N and X 2 [ f;g such that X [ fig i (i) ,
Before we precede to our result on contractual Nash stability, let us introduce the domain of separable preferences and additive preferences. 
For further purposes in this paper, we will rede…ne separability in the following manner.
For each i 2 N , let G i , U i , and B i be the sets of desirable, neutral, and undesirable coalitional partners, respectively, of player i, i.e., Let us now redirect our attention to the existence of contractually Nash stable coalition structures. First, as a related result, it was shown in [4] that if the additive separable preference domain is under consideration, then imposing symmetry (i.e., v i (j) = v j (i) for every i; j 2 N ) on players'preferences guarantees the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure. Moreover, symmetry is a critical condition for this result in the sense that a Nash stable coalition structure may fail to exist by weakening symmetry to mutuality.
Recall that a preference pro…le satis…es mutuality if, for every i; j 2 N , i 6 = j, Clearly, under additive separability, mutuality means that, for every i; j 2 N , i 6 = j,
Notice further that, even with mutuality and on the additive separable preference domain, contractual Nash stability is strictly weaker than Nash stability. This is illustrated by our next example containing a game for which a contractual Nash stable coalition structure exists and no Nash stable coalition structure exists. This example is given in [3] and used in [4] to show the nonexistence of individually stable coalition structures, which implies the nonexistence of Nash stable coalition structures.
Example 3 Consider the hedonic game hN; i with N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and an additive separable preference pro…le de…ned by the following v i s. It can easily be veri…ed that v i (j) 0 if and only if v j (i) 0 for each i; j 2 N , i.e., mutuality is satis…ed. Observe that, for each coalition structure , nash( ) 6 = ; if jXj 3 or jXj = 1 for some X 2 . In fact, each coalition structure contains at least one such a coalition X. Therefore, a Nash stable coalition structure does not exist. Now consider the coalition structure = fN g, and we show that is contractually Nash stable. Observe that nash( ) = ff1g; f2g; f3g; f4g; f5gg. The next example shows that, again on the additive separable preference domain, contractual Nash stability is strictly stronger than contractual individual stability. Namely, for the hedonic game shown in the example, no contractual Nash stable coalition structure exists and a contractual individual stability exists.
Example 4 Consider the hedonic game hN; i with N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and an additive separable preference pro…le de…ned by the following v i s.
As mentioned in the previous section, on any preference domain, a contractual individually stable coalition structure always exists. Let = ff1g; f2g; f3; 4gg. Then, we have weak( ) = ff1; 4g; f2; 4gg, but f1; 4g; f2; 4g 6 2 cont( ) from f3g 3 f3; 4g. Thus, nash( ) \ cont( ) \ weak( ) = ;, i.e., is contractual individually stable.
Now we show that a contractually Nash stable coalition structure does not exist. Observe that we have v 1 (3) = v 2 (1) = v 3 (2) = 2 and P j2X v i (j) 1 for each i 2 N and for each X 2 A i . Thus, for each coalition structure ,
and hence, is contractually Nash stable only if (1), (2), (3) are three di¤erent coalitions. Let be a coalition structure for which this is indeed the case. Then, we have
Therefore, nash( )\cont( ) 6 = ; for each coalition structure , i.e., a contractually Nash stable coalition structure does not exist for this game.
We are ready now to provide a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a contractually Nash stable coalition structure. In order to state our result, we allow for a larger domain, namely the domain of separable preference pro…les, and impose a weaker version of mutuality. Let = ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n ) be a preference pro…le. We say that is weakly mutual if,
Clearly, weak mutuality is implied by mutuality.
Proposition 2 Let hN; i be a separable hedonic game satisfying weak mutuality. Then, a contractually Nash stable coalition structure exists.
Proof. Let hN; i be as above and let S = S i2N G i . By de…nition, for each i 2 S, there exists j 2 N such that i 2 G j , and conversely, for each i 2 N n S, we have i 6 2 G j for each j 2 N . Then, let be a coalition structure de…ned as follows:
Observe that we have (i) = S if i 2 S, and otherwise (i) = fig 
Remark 3
Observe that players'preferences in the hedonic game of Example 4 are separable (more precisely, additive separable), but they do not satisfy weak mutuality. Hence, weak mutuality is a critical condition for the existence of contractually Nash stable coalition structures.
Weak individual stability
We turn now to the study of weak individual stability. Recall that a coalition structure is weak individually stable if nash( ) \ strong( ) = ;;
i.e., there does not exist a pair (i; X) of i 2 N and
Notice that, as it can be illustrated by means of Example 3 (cf. [4] ), there are additive separable hedonic games satisfying mutuality with no weak individually stable coalition structures. It follows that even if preferences are additive separable, requiring mutuality does not su¢ ce for the existence of weak individually stable coalition structure.
In order to present an existence result for weak individually stable coalition structures, we introduce a solidarity condition. It has a very intuitive interpretation and says that if a player j likes another player i, then all "undesirable"players for i are also "undesirable" for j.
Let = ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n ) be a preference pro…le. We say that satis…es solidarity if, for all i; j 2 N ,
In our next lemma, we show an important implication of this condition.
Lemma 4 Let hN; i be a hedonic game satisfying solidarity. For every i; j 2 N with
Proof. Let hN; i be as above, and let i; j 2 N be such that i 6 = j, i 2 G j , and j 2 G i . By
As it turns out, this implication of the solidarity condition guarantees the existence of weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games.
Proposition 3 Let hN; i be a separable hedonic game satisfying solidarity. Then, a weak individually stable coalition structure exists.
Proof. Let hN; i be as above and let be the coalition structure constructed by the following algorithm.
Step 1. Set := ; and R := N .
Step 2. Repeats the following until R = ;:
Find one of the largest coalitions X R such that for each nonempty proper subset Y of X, there exists pair (i; j) of i 2 Y and j 2 X n Y satisfying i 2 G j and j 2 G i .
Set := [ fXg and R := R n X.
In graph theoretical terms, each X 2 is a connected component of the undirected graph G = (N; E) with node set N and edge set E = ffi; jg N j i 6 = j; i 2 G j ; j 2 G i g. Hence, is the unique partition of N into connected components of G = (N; E).
Obviously, constructed by this algorithm is a coalition structure. By applying Lemma 4 it can be easily shown that Notice …nally that if we narrow the domain of separable preferences by requiring that each player views every other player either as a desirable or as a undesirable coalitional partner (i.e., U i = ; for all i 2 N ), then the solidarity condition guarantees the existence of individually stable coalition structures as well. This is due simply to the fact that in such an environment weak individual stability and individual stability coincide.
Conclusion
The taxonomy of stability concepts for hedonic games o¤ered in this paper relies on the simple observation that each deviation from a coalition structure re ‡ects di¤erent degrees of social intervention in one's strong wish to migrate to another group of players.
The di¤erences in the social intervention were taken into account when constructing the di¤erent sets of coalitional deviations that, in turn, led to several new stability notions.
It was shown that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, while on the class of separable games one needs additional conditions in order to assure the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures.
As mentioned in the Introduction, our taxonomy considers only myopic stability concepts. However, it would be worthy to place the newly introduced stability notions in a framework in which players are farsighted in the sense that they take into account how their decisions to form a coalition will a¤ect in the future the decisions of other players. If players' preferences are strict, it was shown in [9] that all core stable structures are coalitional farsightedly stable as well, and that a corresponding result holds true for Nash stability but neither for individual stability nor for contractual individual stability.
Since both contractual strict core stability and weak individual stability are weaker concepts than individual stability, one would expect that the corresponding farsighted notions would re…ne their myopic counterparts. On the other hand, contractual Nash stability is weaker than Nash stability and stronger than contractual individual stability. Hence, one needs further investigations on how the relationship between the corresponding farsighted and myopic counterparts of this stability notion would look like.
